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Abstract 
The public economic literature of the past century is characterized by a traditional 
paradigm  that  ascribes  little  attention  to  the  spatial  dimension.  However, 
contemporary globalization requires that researchers and economists expand their 
perspectives  to  consider  space  conceptualization.  What  is  required  in  the  21st 
century is a richer and more realistic framework that broadens existing concepts of 
socio-economic  analysis  while  overcoming  narrow  national  borders.  Although 
national  governments  will  remain  prominent  performers  in  the  global  market, 
regional and local governments cannot be ignored because citizens worldwide are 
exerting greater self-determination in influencing governmental decisions.  
This  paper  is  focused  on  the  opportunity  to  analyze  the  governance  of 
decentralization  by  the  new  optimizing  procedures  provided  by  complex  system 
theory. The first section of the paper explores the positive and normative issues 
related to centralization and decentralization in a globalized framework as well as 
the  increased  interdependence  in  power  sharing  among  different  jurisdictional 
level. In the second section, Kauffman’s (1993) contributions are examined as a 
means of determining if the fitness landscape allows combining the institutional 
evolution. Finally, this paper concludes highlighting that complex system theory is 
one of the possible tools useful to redesign the map of institutional sharing power in 
an era of globalization, considering that it allows catching Pareto improving in the 
level of welfare.  
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1. Introduction 
The public economic literature of the past century is characterized by a traditional 
paradigm that ascribes little attention to the spatial dimension. This limitation is 
reflective of the difficulty arising from the integration of territory-specific factors 
into  a  higher  level  of  abstraction  required  by  marginal  calculus.  However, 
contemporary globalization requires that researchers and economists expand their 
perspectives  to  consider  space  conceptualization.  What  is  required  in  the  21st 
century is a richer and more realistic framework that broadens existing concepts of 
socio-economic  analysis  while  overcoming  narrow  national  borders.  Although 
national  governments  will  remain  prominent  performers  in  the  global  market, 
regional and local governments cannot be ignored because citizens worldwide are 
exerting  greater  self-determination  in  influencing  government  decisions.  Most 
democracies today have sub-national governments, and countries worldwide are 
providing  political,  fiscal,  and  administrative  powers  to  sub-national  tiers  of 
government.  Unfortunately,  sometimes  decentralization  is  implemented 
haphazardly,  resulting  in  central  decision  makers  losing  control  of  the 
decentralization process. In particular, local frameworks are often ignored when 
models  of  decentralization  from  other  countries  are  adopted  without  any 
modification. 
Theoretically  speaking,  globalization  can  enhance  diversity  of  local  policy 
preferences
1 while simultaneously reducing the benefits of being part of a larger 
political  union.  In  other  words,  on  one  hand  we  should  expect  demands  for 
decentralization to increase while on the other hand opposition to decentralization 
is  also  likely  to  increase.  This  theory  is  supported  by  market  literature  that 
examines international investors’ preferences for more political decentralization as 
horizontal  competition  among  regions
2  increases.  Salmon  (1998)  addressed  the 
unrealistic descriptions of competition models in economics and pointed out that 
“This by no means excludes, at a different level of abstraction or generality, the 
detailed examination of an almost infinite variety of interactions, not all of them 
competitive. For Breton, it is clear that the same approach or strategy should be 
adopted to study government” (p. 125).  
A  large  part  of  literature  focuses  on  the  positive  effects  of  both  vertical  and 
horizontal  competition  among  governments  while  some  experts  consider  the 
decline in government power which results from increasingly footloose tax base. 
                                                           
1 For a detailed analysis  on how global economic integration increases  regional diversity, see Deeg 
(2001), p. 51. 
2 Deeg (2001) clearly highlights that “Investors would then expect higher levels of subsidies for their 
investment, whether through direct cash transfers, lower taxes, wage suppression, or other market 
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The expected
3 results have spread across countries along different spectrums and 
with varying levels of development. Some empirical evidence underscores the need 
to  create  appropriate  conditions  for  achieving  the  objectives  of  fiscal 
decentralization.  
Conversely,  Garrett  and  Rodden  (2000)  emphasized  the  fact  that  many  regions 
increase their demand for fiscal centralization in order to obtain a stronger central 
government that can protect them against sudden economic downturns and cover 
their  needs  through  fiscal  transfers.  Therefore,  market  integration  seemingly 
generates incentives for both centralization and decentralization within the same 
socio-economic systems.  Yet a country’s particular political institutions  must be 
considered when fiscal centralization is being implemented in response to trade 
integration (Garret and Rodden as cited in Deeg, 2001). 
This  dichotomous  generation  of  incentives  for  both  centralization  and 
decentralization within the same system indicates that even if resource allocation 
and linked benefits of a decentralized government are unquestioned (Tanzi 1996), 
the  multiplicity  of  government  functions  raises  substantial  problems  for 
macroeconomic control at the national level. Therefore, it seems “that the actions 
of decision-makers in the real economic world should be studied … in the light of 
the capacity of the human mind to frame problems, and to represent reality in 
innovative ways, in an endeavor to reduce their uncertainty and ignorance” (Egidi 
and Marengo, 2002: 11). In this scenario, new disciplines could help to investigate 
“the  classic  yet  still  unresolved  questions  of  human  creativity  …  and  their 
relationship with the evolution of institutions” ensuring  the migration from the 
conventional systems to adaptive complex systems (Egidi and Marengo, 2002: 11). 
This  paper  focuses  on  investigating  the  possibility  of  implementing  a  new 
methodology  for  analyzing  the  evolution  of  fiscal  processes  and  evaluating  the 
usefulness of new optimizing procedures for the governance of decentralization. 
The first section of this paper explores positive and normative issues related to 
centralization  and  decentralization  in  a  globalized  framework  as  well  as  the 
fundamental  role  of  increased  interdependence  in  power  sharing  among 
jurisdictions. In the second section, Kauffman’s (1993) contributions are examined 
as  a  means  of  determining  if  the  topography  of  the  landscape  ought  to  be 
considered  when  combining  conflicting  centralization  and  decentralization 
processes.  Finally,  this  paper  concludes  with  an  exploration  of  how  a  form  of 
intermediate  coordination  between  fully  centralized  and  fully  decentralized 
systems  could  provide  the  best  outcome.  Such  an  intermediate  form  of 
coordination  applied  to  a  framework  with  several  agents  (each  of  which  has 
exclusive control over more than one but less than all elements), seems to be the 
                                                           
3 Such as to enable efficient allocation of resources, improve governance, accelerate economic growth, 
reduce poverty, achieve a gender balance and empower weaker sections of society. Maria ROSARİA ALFANO 
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best solution for fully decentralized decision processes that are a hindrance in cases 
of  congruent  jurisdictions  or  cases  involving  strong  interdependencies  (e.g., 
globalized systems).  
2. Centralization and Decentralization in a Globalized Framework 
The issues related to centralized and decentralized systems in economic production 
have  long  been  debated  in  economics  literature.  First,  Coase  pointed  out  how 
economic agents incur an unseen cost when they rely on decentralized markets; 
Hayek  then  argued  that  “decentralized  systems  have  information  processing 
advantages since economic agents acting on local information could process more 
information than a central coordinator” (as cited in Williams, 2000: 1). 
2.1. Decentralization 
The  traditional  framework  for  fiscal  decentralization  is  drawn  from  the 
contributions of Stigler, Musgrave, Buchanan and Oates. The classic argument in 
favor  of  decentralization  is  that  local  governments  are  more  efficient  and 
responsive  to  the  needs  of  citizens  as  well  as  being  held  to  a  higher  level  of 
accountability than national government structures. In spatial considerations, sub-
national  governments  become  a  necessary  conduit  for  setting  up  an  efficient 
solution  for  equating  benefits  and  cost.  Yet  new  perspectives  on  economic 
integration and the vertical distribution of governmental authority reveal a basic 
trade-off between the benefits of large jurisdictions and the costs of heterogeneity 
in  large  populations  (Alesina  and  Sporaore,  1997;  Alesina  and  Wacziarg,  1998). 
Benefits  seem  to  be  derived  from  the  availability  of  more  efficient  forms  of 
taxation, common defense, free trade within the country, economies of scale, and 
the decreasing per capita costs of non-rival public goods; however, these benefits 
must  be  compared  to  the  costs  of  satisfying  people  with  heterogeneous 
preferences  and  income  levels  across  regions.  The  costs  and  benefits  of 
maintaining  a  large  jurisdiction  thus  affect  the  demands  for  secession,  in 
accordance  with  the  number  and  size  of  nations.  As  in  the  Musgrave-Oates 
formulation,  sufficiently  high  levels  of  heterogeneity  generate  demands  for 
decentralization or even secession. Many countries stopped this secede demand, 
opting instead for a fiscal decentralization scheme (Alesina and Sporaore 1997). In 
fact,  “any  benefits  of  decentralization  that  might  be  obtained  in  a  world  with 
several nations may also be achieved within a unified nation by replicating the 
administrative  structure  of  the  world  with  several  nations  and  implementing  a 
suitable degree of decentralization of authority among the regions” (Bolton and 
Roland, 1997: 1057-58). 
The Leviathan monolithic government hypothesis (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977, 
1978,  1980)  asserts  that  massive  migration  would  be  the  result  in  the  case  a 
particular  jurisdiction  attempt  to  exploit  citizens  in  a  Tiebout  situation,  “any Centralization and Decentralization of Public Policy in a Complex Framework 
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attempt on the part of one jurisdiction to exploit its citizens would cause massive 
out-migration  to  an  alternative,  non-exploiting  jurisdiction  (intergovernmental 
competition)”. Goodspeed (1998) underlined that “the horizontal tax competition 
can result in an efficient allocation of resources if the taxes used are benefit taxes. 
…. If taxes do not reflect benefits, however, Oates (1972) suggests that externalities 
are created so that tax prices diverge from social marginal cost”. Therefore, this 
decentralization  hypothesis  assumes  implicitly  that  fiscal  decentralization  (and 
fragmentation)  automatically  implies  increased  levels  of  horizontal  competition 
among jurisdictions (Atkinson 2006) thereby decreasing the ability of Leviathan to 
extract  resources  from  the  private  sector
4.  Therefore,  an  increase  in  fiscal 
decentralization  will  lead  to  less  total  government  spending  and  restrict 
government intrusion into the economy, ceteris paribus, and will extend taxes and 
expenditures  of  decentralized  institutions.  However,  it  is  possible  that  as 
decentralization  occurs,  the  component  governments  in  a  federal  system  may 
collude  to  organize  a  cartel-like  arrangement  in  order  to  circumvent  the 
competitive  influences  of  fiscal  federalism.  Brennan  and  Buchanan  (1980) 
explained, “within a constitutionally designed federal structure, one would predict 
that there would be constant pressure by competitive lower-level governments to 
secure institutional rearrangements that would moderate competitive pressures” 
(Shadbegian, 1999: 262 - s). 
2.2. Centralization 
Economic  integration  seems  to  increase  the  credibility  of  secession  threats  in 
countries with high levels of income inequality between regions. In this case, it may 
well be possible to forestall secession by instituting a decentralization program, 
which allows local governments’ greater freedom over local schools and cultural 
institutions.  Such  devolution  need  not  translate,  however,  into  a  shift  of  fiscal 
resources into the hands of local governments. Therefore, even if fiscal federalism 
could  increases  economic  competition  among  regions  and  it  is  likely  to  justify 
smaller  governments,  the  more  integrated  economies  are  exacerbating  the 
demands for governmental redistribution of wealth and powerful regions pushing 
across centralized systems of taxing and spending, rather than decentralized ones.  
Following the economic logic of fiscal decentralization and with the political logic of 
centralization,  Garrett  and  Rodden  (2000)  empirically  showed  that  globalization 
increases demand for fiscal centralization. In their study of 60 countries from 1978-
1997, Garret and Rodden concluded: 
Globalization may have made [centralization] possible for smaller political units to 
break away from larger extant nations. But it has also empowered regions that 
                                                           
4 For an interesting and deep discussion about the empirical relationship evidence that supports both 
Brennan and Buchanan hypotheses, see Shadbegian (1999). Maria ROSARİA ALFANO 
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choose to stay within countries to push for fiscal arrangements that better mitigate 
market  risk  for  citizens  within  their  borders.  And  it  is  centralized  systems  that 
achieve this objective. Finally, these authors show that the vertical organization of 
the public sector is much more than an efficient institutional response to shifting 
demands  of  voters  and  investors  (2000:  21).  In  fact,  this  agents  perceive  that 
globalization strictly increases the volatility and aggregate economic risk therefore 
they look for a national insurance schemes which can only be handled by central 
government that, having tax authority and power for geographical distribution of 
expenditures,  ensures  that  this  scheme  should  work  through  pro-cyclical 
subnational spending. 
More,  the  globalization  process  increases  also  the  aggregate  social  utility  of 
automatic interregional tax-transfer insurance schemes. An additional consequence 
of  economic  integration,  as  suggested  by  Krugman  (1991),  is  the  regional 
specialization that increases the vulnerable export-oriented jurisdictions, referred 
to as “export clusters,” with relatively undiversified economies. Obviously this fiscal 
centralization logic holds in countries where regional business cycles are not highly 
correlated; therefore, these issues seem most plausible in large and diverse nation-
states.  
These  contrasts  suggest  that  important  issues  linking  globalization  and  the 
movement of authority between different levels of government remain not only 
unresolved but are also increased by the cross-border activities which give rise to 
struggles among different jurisdictions at the lower level. These struggles lead to 
strong interdependence and cause crises of the traditional modes of operation. 
2.3. Interdependence 
Interdependence  is  the  main  consequence  of  increased  integration  among 
economic and political institutions. In this scenario, physical space, proximity, and 
power sharing among jurisdictions play a fundamental role. Theory and evidence
5 
indicate that decisions relating to decentralization are influenced by a number of 
exogenous  factors.  The  interdependencies  among  jurisdictions  vary  along  a 
continuum; so revenue functions of each may be dependent or they may have joint 
supply and cost functions. 
A  large  part  of  economic  literature  examines  fiscal  interdependence  among 
governments and the externalities created by such dependencies, which directly 
influence the central public decision maker to delegate decision rights and also 
implies  that  there  are  benefits  by  coordinating  the  activities  at  the  lower-level 
jurisdictions. The local public decision maker is delegated decision rights that will 
optimize the welfare of his own jurisdiction rather than consider the impact of his 
decisions on other jurisdictions. Hence, the cost associated with decentralization 
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will increase as operating dependencies increase; therefore, centralization will be 
the least cost option when interdependencies are high. 
Current globalization trends suggest that the interdependencies are progressively 
increasing. Therefore, fiscal fragmentation, in the case where taxes do not reflect 
benefits,  indicates  that  levels  of  destructive  downward  competition  among 
jurisdictions is increasing, which leads to distortion in the allocation of factors and a 
lower level of public services than what would be optimal. 
There  is  a  rich  literature
6  describing  (a)  the  computationally  intractable 
heterogeneous  individual  elements,  (b)  endogenously  determined  individual 
responses to changes in state, and (c) inter-element spillover effects of substantial 
magnitude.  Rust  defines  "computationally  intractable"  problems  as  those  "for 
which the lower bound on the computation cost increases exponentially with the 
problem  dimension".  Therefore,  in  the  worst  case  complexity  bounds,  “many 
intractable problems become tractable when we consider alternative measures of 
complexity  which  account  for  different  amounts  of  prior  information  about  a 
problem and allow for different ways of assessing the accuracy or quality of an 
approximate solution”(Rust, 1997: 3). 
3. Conflicting Constraints Interdependencies as Complex Systems 
A better analysis to control interactions requires the investigation of evolutionary 
concepts throughout the history of economic thought. For example, Alchian (1950) 
interpreted the static concept of equilibrium in perfectly competitive markets of 
neoclassical economics as the outcome of a dynamic selection process between 
competing firms. Although Alchian focused only on profit maximization, he was 
clear about the application to consumers. This implies, as Simon (1969) defined, 
that systems containing elements that are interrelated within a particular structure 
can be defined as complex systems. Hence, “the dependencies between elements 
imply  that  the  choice  of  an  element  cannot  be  made  independently  from  the 
choice of other elements due to interaction effects. The set of optimal choices for 
the  elements  with  regard  to  element-specific  output  variables  may  prove 
suboptimal when the effects of dependencies between elements are taken into 
account” (Frenken, 2001a: 4)
7. 
Kauffman (1993) contributes to our understanding of search processes by relating 
the  topography  of  the  landscape  to  the  underlying  interdependence  of  the 
components being combined. His simulations include two parameters: the number 
of components and the degree of interdependence between those components. 
                                                           
6 See Rust (1997) that provides an excellent overview of the development of impossibility theorems in 
these various disciplines.  
7 For further details see Frenken et al. (1999). Maria ROSARİA ALFANO 
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A socio-economic system is a complex system consisting of a multitude of agents, 
households, firms and different level of  governments, which interact under the 
broad umbrella of cooperation and competition developing several economic and 
political  activities  that  often  span  several  hierarchical  levels  of  functional 
interdependence. In this scenario, the socio-economic analysis of decentralization 
could be characterized by conflicting constraint due to interdependencies between 
its constituting elements that requires analysis of dynamic efficiency in which the 
central point is to consider what should be the organization of a socio-economics 
model and in what ways a fitness landscape can be searched. Waldrop (1992) and 
Kauffman (1995) adopted Wright’s idea (1932) to study evolution, by visualizing the 
distribution of fitness values, as a kind of landscape. 
3.1.  NK  Fitness  Landscapes  to  Analyze  the  Evolution  of 
Interdependence among Jurisdictions 
Kauffman's  representation  of  a  fitness  landscape  is  a  simple  but  powerful 
framework for considering questions of adaptive learning (Levinthal, 1997). The 
evolutionary  properties  of  complex  systems  have  been  subjects  of  research  in 
theoretical biology (Kauffman and Levin, 1987; Kauffman, 1993). Frenken (2001a) 
discussed  the  various  levels  of  activity  between  genotype  and  phenotype  and 
provided an explanation for complexity. 
Complexity means here that a gene does not simply translate into a particular trait, 
but operates in conjunction with other genes…Due to dependencies among genes, 
a mutation in a single gene may have both positive  effects on some traits and 
negative effects on other traits, which jointly determine an organism’s fitness
8. 
Later  in  evolutionary  economics,  these  models  have  been  used  to  simulate 
economic  agents  randomly  searching  for  new  technological  systems  containing 
interdependent elements by trial-and-error and running the risk of ending up in 
suboptimal solutions. In this scenario the issue of interdependence among policy 
variables  has  been  indicated  in  recent  empirical  work  in  the  human  resource 
literature (Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997). 
The degree of interrelationship among policies has a counterintuitive implication 
for the topography of a fitness landscape. Therefore, similarly to biology studies, 
the competitive decentralization could be described as a complex system that is 
composed of a set of parts of the system, which jointly determine the national 
welfare. Only if some combinations of system parts are complementary can the 
result be a high national welfare. Conversely, if the combinations of system parts 
are incoherent, the result is a lower level of national welfare. Searching for a good 
fit between policy parts of the system is difficult as a mutation in one policy, even if 
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it yields improvements in some functions, may well turn out to be detrimental for 
the overall performance of the political socio-economics system as a whole. 
Obviously  the  interdependencies  between  policy  jurisdictions  indicate  that  the 
choice of one strategy cannot be made independently from the choice of others. 
The existence of interdependencies thus provides a rationale for coordination of 
search activity at a centralized level. More of these independent actions of system 
elements can be handled using genetic algorithms to approach search problems
9. 
In this way the algorithm tries to find a single solution to a complex problem by 
mutating and selecting strings that represent individual solutions to the problem. In 
fact, the main idea is that if the best solutions are selected in many iterations, the 
algorithm would converge to a single very powerful solution in the end. However, 
algorithms often get trapped on a poor solution and several runs often generate 
different  solutions.  This  outcome  has  striking  similarities  to  natural  evolution 
whereby the ultimate complex problem is self replication, which results in greater 
diversity of species. 
The framework for this search problem is the NK-model (Kauffman, 1993), which 
was originally developed as a model of biological evolution even though its formal 
structure  allows  for  many  other  applications
10  because  it  allows  for  handling 
interdependent systems using only two parameters: N stands for the number of 
parts
11 of the system and the factor K determines how many other parts
12 are 
influenced by every other part,
13 evaluating consequently the dependencies or the 
so-called “epistatic relations” that imply a mutation in one element can affect the 
functioning of many other elements
14. 
Starting from these assumptions, we will consider the possibility of borrowing from 
the  NK  model  for  the  purpose  of  solving  the  complex  and  fully  conflicting 
constraints of competitive decentralization among jurisdictions while looking at the 
original ones and identifying the policies and payoff value in the following terms: 
                                                           
9 A detailed explanation about the algorithms operation is in Post and Johnson (1999).  
10 Egidi (2001), provides a highly developed discussion of the features of the evolutionary properties of 
biological systems and the  features of the  evolutionary nature of human artifacts, institutions, and 
organizations, showing that “in human organizations evolution involves a process of collective learning 
that is driven by human conscious will, in which, during a rational, … activity of planning, despite the 
effort … to be fully rational, nevertheless errors are unintentionally created. Even though by mutations it 
is possible to introduce improvements into the organizations, and get closer to an optimal configuration, 
the evolution of an organization based only on mutations should require an enormous amount of time. 
The  evolution  of  organizational  structures  is,  on  the  contrary,  relatively  speed  and  discontinuous, 
because is based on the human ability to represent, design and revise their settings”. 
11 Called by Kauffman “genes or loci”. 
12 Called “loci”. 
13 Called “locus”. 
14See also Frenken (2001a). Maria ROSARİA ALFANO 
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N jurisdictions (1,…,N) for each jurisdiction n (like players in a game), there exists a 
number of states (like strategy in a game), which are coded by integers (0, 1,…..n). 
The  number  of  states  of  a  jurisdiction  n  is  described  as  An .  Each  string  s  is 
described by the chosen states s1,s2...sN and is part of a possibility set S, for which 
holds: 
  { } 1 , ... , 1 , 0 ; ... ; 2 1 - Î = Î n n N A s s s  s s S s
 
The N-dimensional space S, called space design, includes all possible combinations 
between the strategies, assuming that all the jurisdictions have the same number 
of strategies A. The size of the design space S is given by:    
 
N A S =  
The combinatorial nature of the design space of a system requires that elements 
are  orthogonal  to  one  another;  therefore,  one  element  of  a  system  cannot 
correspond with an allele of another element in the same system. 
Kauffman (1993) restricted his analysis of complex systems to particular types of 
architectures  expressed  by  one  parameter  K,  which  stands  for  the  number  of 
elements.  This  parameter  can  be  considered  as  an  indicator  of  a  system’s 
complexity,  with  K=0  being  the  least  complex  and  K=N-1  the  most  complex 
architecture. 
In our case, a low value of K highlights little interaction among policy choices of 
different  jurisdictions,  so  the  fitness  landscape  is  smooth  or  highly  correlated; 
therefore, a change in one policy has little impact on the fitness contribution of 
other jurisdictional choices. In contrast, a high value of K implies that a change in 
one  jurisdiction  policy  has  a  large  impact  on  the  fitness  contribution  of  other 
jurisdictional choices. Therefore, given an initial setting of incremental change in 
the vector of N, policy jurisdictions may substantially change the overall payoff 
level. As a result, the fitness landscape becomes less correlated, or equivalently, 
more rugged, with a higher K value. When there are significant interaction effects 
among policy variables, there may be a number of local peaks. 
The existence of local optima like peaks in the N-dimensional landscape of fitness 
values are given by strings for which there exists no neighboring string with higher 
fitness. This implies that each neighboring string  cannot reach the local optima 
even if there will be mutation in one element. A peak in a fitness landscape implies 
that a well-known search algorithm by “trial-and-error generates a new string (trial) 
by randomly changing the allele of one element” (Frenken 2001a: 8-9). This process 
proceeds  by  evaluating  how  system  fitness  W  is  affected  by  a  mutation.  The 
existence of multiple peaks characterizes a “rugged landscape.” 
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3.2. NK Model Properties 
To understand the relationship between the complexity of an architecture and the 
properties of its fitness landscape, Kauffman (1993) simulated a large number of 
fitness  landscapes  having  different  values  of  K  and  N.  Therefore,  setting  the 
parameter K from lowest to highest value and comparing the properties of the 
fitness landscapes, they found the following:  
(a) The number of local optima increases exponentially with K and the probability 
to end up in a sub-optimal solution increases with K;  
(b) the “mean fitness of local optima is highest for systems with a positive low 
complexity (around K=3 for N around 8);  
(c) the higher the complexity of a system, the more randomly spread the local 
optima”
15 are in design space;  
and (d) the probability of finding a local optimum with a high fitness value is higher 
than the probability of finding a local optimum with a low fitness values. 
Summing up with rank order statistics, Kauffman highlights the following properties 
in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Cases  A
16  B
17 
Constructional Contraints  K=0  K=N-1 
Local Optima  1  2N/ N+1 
Length of adaptive walk  N/2  Log2N 
In the case of intermediate values of K (0<K< N-1), the highest peaks of the fitness 
landscape  can  be  found  in  the  same  region  of  the  landscape,  and  the  longest 
distance from the highest peak that still contains information about the highest 
region is called the correlation length of the landscape. 
From the above we can conclude that adaptive walk is quite efficient at finding the 
highest point on the fitness landscape in systems with K = 1, where an element's 
fitness contribution is a function only of its own state. On average, it will take no 
                                                           
15 For further details about the optima of less complex systems, see Frenken (2001a), p. 10. 
16 In absence of interaction among the parts there exists a single optimum therefore it can be reached 
from every starting point: i) adaptive walks in this landscape are relatively long (N/2); ii) neighbouring 
points of the landscape are correlated therefore one point can give information about the neighbouring 
points.  Further  details  are  on  the  webpage,  Evolution  on  rugged  fitness  landscapes,  June  2000, 
Colloquium of Berngruber.  
17 In presence of maximum interaction (K=N-1) there exists an enormous number of local optima with 
low  to  intermediate  fitness:  i)  adaptive  walks  in  this  landscape  are  likely  to  get  trapped  in  a  local 
optimum  with  low  fitness;  the  length  of  the  adaptive  walk  is  shorter  than  on  a  smooth  landscape 
(log2N); ii) the landscape is uncorrelated (random) therefore a point gives all kinds of information on its 
neighbor. In a rugged K=N-1 landscape adaptive walks would end sooner (length log2N) than in a smooth 
landscape (length N/2). Further details are on the webpage, Evolution on rugged fitness landscapes, 
June 2000, Colloquium of Berngruber. Maria ROSARİA ALFANO 
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more than N/2  steps of the adaptive  walk to find the optimal configuration of 
simple  systems  with  K=1.  In  systems  with  substantial  interconnections,  the 
algorithm performs progressively less and less effectively. In fact, an increase of 
spillovers induces a ruggedness into the fitness landscape based on the element 
dimension N and the state dimension S. This ruggedness looks like a landscape with 
many points of various heights of which one is the highest. This peak is called the 
"global fitness peak" (global optimum). 
Figure 1 depicts an example of fitness landscape. The two horizontal axes represent 
the  elements  N  and  the  states  S.  The  vertical  axis  represents  the  fitness.  This 
landscape is not particularly rugged; so the adaptive walk algorithm may lead to 
two local optima.  
 
 
Figure 1 
In  economic  situations  the  fitness  is  really  rugged,  so  activity  of  search  is  not 
necessarily local. In fact, human search can mutate any number of elements at the 
same  time,  avoiding  getting  trapped  in  strings  of  purely  optima  local  (Lissack, 
1996), so the application of a sufficient long-search distance will enable an agent to 
find the global optimum because only one string will count as an optimum. The 
number  of  local  optima  in  a  fitness  landscape  is  thus  not  a  given  one,  but 
dependent on the applied search choice (Frenken, et al. 1999).  
The simulations done by Kauffman and Macready (1995) showed that decentralized 
control usually does not optimize a complex system. It might be that the optima 
strings in the case of centralized search does not correspond to the optima in the 
case that the search is decentralized. Hence, it seems that fewer optima exist for 
fully decentralized search compared to fully centralized search and in addition, for Centralization and Decentralization of Public Policy in a Complex Framework 
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strings corresponding to optima in centralized search, there is at least one agent 
that can improve its fitness. For the above reasons decentralized search risks to 
find no optimum at all; therefore, Kauffman and Macready (1995) argued that both 
fully centralized and fully decentralized searches suffer serious deficiencies when 
optimizing complex systems. 
4. Patching 
The above deficiencies pushed Kauffman and Macready (1995) to study a form of 
coordination that is intermediate between fully centralized and fully decentralized 
coordination. This intermediate form of coordination is applied in the case where 
there are several agents, each of which has exclusive control over more than one 
but less than all elements. Therefore, Kauffman partitioned the elements, and each 
block of elements that is controlled by a single agent is called a “patch”. Many 
authors (Post and Johnson, 1999; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999; Sussman, 2000) 
explain  that  difficult  problems  with  many  linked  variables  and  conflicting 
constraints  can  be  solved  by  breaking  the  entire  problem  into  non-overlapping 
domains called patches (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2 
The logic of patches may suggest new powerful tools in the design and handling of 
problems in complex organizations and in the evolution of complex institutions. In 
this  way,  systems  having  various  kinds  of  local  autonomy  may  represent  a 
fundamental  mechanism  underlying  adaptive  evolution  in  economic  and  social 
systems. 
Eisenhardt and Brown (1999) refer to patching as the association of a number of 
interdependent elements to a higher-level construct like to a core element. The 
patching process involves the notion of decomposing a given set of elements into 
smaller subsets to better exploit opportunities, a process related to the patching 
procedure for solving highly interdependent decision problems, as described by 
Kauffman (1995). Maria ROSARİA ALFANO 
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The  analysis  of  institutional  decentralization  could  be  captured  in  a  system  of 
patches in which each group of jurisdictions (patch) selfishly optimizes rather than 
seeking  a  global  optimum,
18  having  a  mindset  that  views  any  structure  as 
temporary  because  the  action  of  each  patch  deforms  the  landscapes  of  other 
patches. Essentially, when a patch finds a good solution, it changes the problem 
faced  by  neighboring  patches.  This  intermediate-level  structure  seems  like  a 
compromise among the varying interests of the patches, so that even though they 
might do things that are contrary to the interests of the whole, the whole learns 
more than it would if central control were in place, therefore, the whole system is 
more efficient. When the interjurisdictional system maps a patching structure, it 
will create a continually shifting mix of highly focused and tightly aligned policies 
that could respond to changing global market opportunities. In fact, patching is less 
critical  when  the  status  is  relatively  unchanging,  but  when  the  situations  are 
turbulent, like in globalization, patching becomes crucial. They balance on the edge 
of  chaos  between  equity  and  efficiency.  Hence  in  the  case  of  competitive 
decentralization, finding a good solution that ensures the maximum welfare for 
one jurisdiction will change the problem to be solved by the parts in the adjacent 
patches. 
If the system is divided into a few large patches, we have large jurisdictions that 
rapidly immobilize poor local optima. If instead the system is fragmented into many 
patches (small jurisdictions), the system remains in a chaotic regime. “The optimum 
behavior is found near the transition phase between order and chaos. Here, as if by 
an invisible hand, the system of selfishly optimizing (hence coevolving) patches, 
optimizes the optimum obtained”
19. This seems to summarize a good compromise 
between  centralized  and  decentralized  authority  structure,  which  should  keep 
constant pressure of separatism linked to the heterogeneity coming from lower-
levels  of  government  and  the  increasing  cost  linked  to  the  existence  of  high 
interdependencies.  
Patch size is P, and it refers to the number of jurisdictions contained in each patch; 
each  jurisdiction  pertains  only  to  one  patch,  so  patch  size  ranges  from  P=1, 
representing a completely decentralized system to P=N, representing a completely 
centralized system. The number of patches is thus given by N/P, within each patch, 
and a search takes place using a local search by mutation in a single unit. Each 
mutation in a patch is assessed with reference to its effect on the average fitness of 
jurisdictions pertaining to its patch and independently of its effect on fitness values 
of jurisdictions related to other patches (Kauffman and Macready, 1995).  
The number of local optima is linked to the levels of decentralization, and generally 
higher fitness, W, can be achieved when the number of local optima is smaller. A 
                                                           
18 See Studying Strategic Landscapes on Lissack’s Web page. 
19 Kauffman, Lecture 1, Coevolutionarily constructable communities of adaptive entities … to a self-
organized critical state, http://www.santafe.edu/sfi/People/kauffman/ Lecture-1.html.  Centralization and Decentralization of Public Policy in a Complex Framework 
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lower number of local optima in a fitness landscape computation indicates costs, in 
term of time, to reach a local optimum. Conversely, a higher level of centralization 
indicates  costs  of  evaluation  of  a  mutation  in  one  jurisdiction,  hence,  higher 
coordination costs. 
According to Kauffman and Macready (1995), the optimal fitness values by local 
search were indeed reached for patch size levels between 1 and N, with the exact 
optimal  value  depending  on  N.  Of  course,  emerge  that  “intermediate  levels  of 
centralization  are  to  be  preferred  to  balance  the  number  of  local  optima  and 
coordination costs at the one hand and the time-efficiency of search on the other 
hand” (Frenken, 2001b: 16). 
4.1 Congruence among Jurisdictions 
The effectiveness of patching as a tool for handling these complex problems is 
dependent upon the relationship between patch boundaries and spillover effects 
between individual elements and those inter-element effects that are internalized 
within patches and those that are not. Central and local governments have to solve 
problems defined over complex systems so a main goal for the institutions is the 
formation  of  congruent,  independently  optimized  decision-making  sublevels
20. 
Dividing into "patches the institution allows or prohibits "changes of state" at the 
"patch  members"  on  the  basis  of  the  aggregate  within  and  overall  effects. 
Decentralized  rule-making  systems  in  which  individuals  are  members  of  non-
overlapping
21 groups function according to the perceived welfare of the individuals 
within the sublevels of governments and tend to define their patch boundaries 
geographically.  Obviously  decision-making  patches  aligned  in  geographic  terms 
allow for the activation of a mechanism for finding the highest peak for any system 
where spillovers are geographically distributed and decision-making units within 
the patches are largely congruent. 
The  implications  of  this  work  for  institutional  innovation  may  come  as  a  small 
surprise to those familiar with theories of competitive federalism. Dividing up a 
complex  system  into  independent  self-optimizing  decision-making  patches  can 
increase the efficiency of the search for optimal system-wide configurations. These 
theories reflect a broad consensus regarding the benefits of a decentralized system 
that can work as an efficient sorting mechanism. In fact, dividing a decision-making 
policy into subunits may be subject to fewer inefficiencies of information transfer; 
therefore, local governments and consumers will be more likely to make better 
(welfare-maximizing) decisions.  
                                                           
20 For a traditional point of view about the optimal structure of local governments, see Hochman, Pines 
and Thisse (1995). 
21 For more information on the overlapping concept in a federal framework, see Casella and Frey (1992). Maria ROSARİA ALFANO 
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On  the  other  hand,  there  are  costs  associated  with  decentralization  where 
jurisdictions are not congruent. But nowadays the assumption of geographically 
clustered  spillovers  no  longer  holds;  in  fact,  there  is  a  strong  increase  in  the 
magnitude  of  between-patch  spillovers,  so  the  relationship  between  patch 
membership and spillovers has been perturbed in a substantial way. Therefore, we 
must find ways to re-establish the congruence
22 of jurisdiction groups as efficient 
problem-solving mechanisms. Globalization might reduce the congruence founded 
on  the  geographical  aspect  and  give  rise  to  jurisdiction  groups  with  low 
congruence, and the independent decisions of such patches will be increasingly 
unlikely to find high peaks on the global welfare landscape. 
Patching may be more than merely a metaphor for decentralized systems; those 
structures  may,  in  a  sense,  be  instantiations  of  the  patching  algorithm  in  the 
political realm. The underlying mechanics of the patching algorithm appears to be 
effective  precisely  because  it  is  destabilizing.  This  destabilization  allows  local 
configurations to change in ways that may be suboptimal in the short term from 
the standpoint of the system as a whole, driving the system down from suboptimal 
foothills in fitness space, but these moves alter the environment of other local 
units, generating reactions and adjustments by these adversely affected neighbors 
and creating a pull and tug among conflicting rule sets that ultimately allows the 
overall matrix to achieve a better solution over the course of a large number of 
moves. 
Summarizing  the  effectiveness  of  patching  as  a  tool  to  handle  these  complex 
problems depends on the relationship between the borders of the patch and the 
spillover effects among the single elements. In this context, as highlighted by Post 
and Johnson (1999), patching seems to work better in a system having the right 
equilibrium between internalization and non-internalization of the effect for other 
elements within a patch, like a congruence between 0 and 1. 
Implications arise from such discussions at an institutional level, in particular in 
designing the dimension and the level of government power. Therefore, the central 
point is to design congruent subgroups that optimize independently. In this way, 
the local governments that are members of subgroups that do not overlap each 
other  decide  on  evaluating  the  effects  of  behavior  on  the  under-group 
geographically defined as a patch. This division in independent decisional patch 
self-optimizing can increase the efficiency and indicate that decentralized decisions 
are disadvantageous when jurisdictions are congruent or the interdependences are 
strong. In other words, the institutional federalism seems to work better in systems 
having an intermediary level of congruence rather than in the cases of spillovers 
that are weakly internalized inside the patch (low congruence). 
                                                           
22 Further details about the congruence are in Post and Johnson (1999). Centralization and Decentralization of Public Policy in a Complex Framework 
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5. Conclusions 
This approach points out that dividing up a complex system into independent self-
optimizing decision-making patches increases the efficiency of research for optimal 
welfare because each subunit of the decision is subject to fewer inefficiencies of 
information transfer. On the other hand, there are costs of decentralization where 
the jurisdictions are not congruent. 
Innovation in institutional design seemingly can be handled by patching, the size of 
which  depends  on  the  relationship  between  the  borders  of  the  patch  and  the 
spillover  effects  among  the  single  elements.  This  suggests  that  decentralized 
decision-making systems like competitive federalism need one efficient method of 
finding  optimal  configurations  of  a  problem-solving  algorithm  which  seems  to 
crucially depend on the relationship between spillover effects within-jurisdiction 
and between-jurisdiction. Hence, the above described methodology seems one of 
the possible tools useful to redesign the map of institutional sharing power in an 
era of globalization, considering that it allows to catch Pareto improving in the level 
of  welfare.  In  particular,  as  Frenken  (2001b)  suggests,  “intermediate  levels  of 
centralization  are  to  be  preferred  to  balance  the  number  of  local  optima  and 
coordination costs at the one hand and the time-efficiency of search on the other 
hand” ( 16). 
 In this scenario, a form of intermediate coordination between fully centralized and 
fully decentralized will provide the best outcome; because an intermediate form of 
coordination applied to a framework with several jurisdictions solves the problem 
of fully decentralized decision process that are disadvantageous where jurisdictions 
are  congruent  or  where  the  interdependences  are  strong  like  in  the  case  of 
globalized world.  
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